Nash: non-cooperative games

What changed

The 1951 paper made the finite-game proof more direct and added symmetry and equilibrium-set structure beyond the 1950 existence note.

Scientific scope

This exact 1951 Annals paper is assessed for its new proof, symmetric-game and equilibrium-set results, formal exposition and bounded poker analysis; it does not take a second credit for the equilibrium concept and original existence result already published in the 1950 PNAS note. Symmetric equilibrium and geometric theorems have their stated finite-game and solvability hypotheses.

Evidence

The linked sources identify this contribution and its scope. WRS has not independently reconstructed the scientific claims. The record is Nash's sole-author 1951 Annals of Mathematics article. His 1950 dissertation and PNAS note are separate works; the existence theorem does not imply uniqueness, efficient computation, stability or descriptive accuracy in every strategic setting.

Contributors

• John F. Nash · SCIENCE: Named source author of the scoped work; individual effort shares are not measured.

• JSTOR record for Nash non-cooperative games
• University of South Carolina record and copy of Nash paper
• Nash: non-cooperative games

Provisional WRS assessment, edition 2026-10-16.1. Independent expert calibration is pending. This grade does not certify correctness or assign ownership.

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