What is recorded here?
Formulated non-cooperative games in strategic form and proved existence of equilibrium points in mixed strategies for finite games using a fixed-point argument.
Source-linked catalogue note. A detailed explanatory guide has not yet been prepared for this entry.
Scientific scope
The record is Nash's sole-author 1951 Annals of Mathematics article. His 1950 dissertation and PNAS note are separate works; the existence theorem does not imply uniqueness, efficient computation, stability or descriptive accuracy in every strategic setting.
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- JSTOR record for Nash non-cooperative games
- University of South Carolina record and copy of Nash paper
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People and systems
John F. Nash
The named authors contributed to this scoped work; individual effort shares and later applications are not assigned by the byline.
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Documented countries / regions: United States
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English catalogue narrative
Nash: non-cooperative games
Formulated non-cooperative games in strategic form and proved existence of equilibrium points in mixed strategies for finite games using a fixed-point argument.
Scientific scope
The record is Nash's sole-author 1951 Annals of Mathematics article. His 1950 dissertation and PNAS note are separate works; the existence theorem does not imply uniqueness, efficient computation, stability or descriptive accuracy in every strategic setting.
Reading status
This is a source-linked WRS catalogue note. A full explanatory guide and independent scientific reconstruction have not been completed for this entry. Read the identified original work for its complete narrative and arguments.
People and systems
John F. Nash
The named authors contributed to this scoped work; individual effort shares and later applications are not assigned by the byline.