SWhat changed
Established existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium for every finite game by applying a fixed-point theorem to the correspondence of best replies.
Scientific scope
Established existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium for every finite game by applying a fixed-point theorem to the correspondence of best replies. Scope limitation: Existence does not imply a pure-strategy equilibrium, uniqueness, equal payoffs across equilibria or an efficient algorithm for finding one. The note credits David Gale for suggesting Kakutani’s theorem; this does not make Gale a paper coauthor.
Evidence
Assessment uses the catalogue-linked source evidence for the stated contribution. Existence does not imply a pure-strategy equilibrium, uniqueness, equal payoffs across equilibria or an efficient algorithm for finding one. The note credits David Gale for suggesting Kakutani’s theorem; this does not make Gale a paper coauthor.
Contributors
- John F. Nash, Jr. · SCIENCE: Named source contributor; exact labor shares are not measured.
Provisional WRS assessment, edition 2026-10-16.1. Independent expert calibration is pending. This grade does not certify correctness or assign ownership.
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