What is recorded here?
Established existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium for every finite game by applying a fixed-point theorem to the correspondence of best replies.
Source-linked catalogue note. A detailed explanatory guide has not yet been prepared for this entry.
Scientific scope
Existence does not imply a pure-strategy equilibrium, uniqueness, equal payoffs across equilibria or an efficient algorithm for finding one. The note credits David Gale for suggesting Kakutani’s theorem; this does not make Gale a paper coauthor.
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People and systems
John F. Nash, Jr.
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Documented countries / regions: United States
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English catalogue narrative
Nash: equilibrium in finite games
Established existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium for every finite game by applying a fixed-point theorem to the correspondence of best replies.
Scientific scope
Existence does not imply a pure-strategy equilibrium, uniqueness, equal payoffs across equilibria or an efficient algorithm for finding one. The note credits David Gale for suggesting Kakutani’s theorem; this does not make Gale a paper coauthor.
Reading status
This is a source-linked WRS catalogue note. A full explanatory guide and independent scientific reconstruction have not been completed for this entry. Read the identified original work for its complete narrative and arguments.
People and systems
John F. Nash, Jr.
Listed source contributors; individual labor shares are not measured