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Arrow: the social-choice impossibility theorem

Contribution grade

Social choice · Scoped scientific or research-capability contribution

Reference score120,000Provisional editorial estimate of this exact contribution; its grade is assessed separately.

What changed

Showed an incompatibility between unrestricted preference orderings over at least three alternatives and the stated social-ordering, positive-association, independence, non-imposition and non-dictatorship requirements.

Scientific scope

Showed an incompatibility between unrestricted preference orderings over at least three alternatives and the stated social-ordering, positive-association, independence, non-imposition and non-dictatorship requirements. Scope limitation: The record follows the 1950 conditions rather than silently substituting a later axiom system. It is a conditional impossibility theorem about aggregation rules, not a claim that every voting method is useless or that collective decisions are impossible.

Evidence

Assessment uses the catalogue-linked source evidence for the stated contribution. The record follows the 1950 conditions rather than silently substituting a later axiom system. It is a conditional impossibility theorem about aggregation rules, not a claim that every voting method is useless or that collective decisions are impossible.

Contributors

Provisional WRS assessment, edition 2026-10-16.1. Independent expert calibration is pending. This grade does not certify correctness or assign ownership.

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