What is recorded here?
Showed an incompatibility between unrestricted preference orderings over at least three alternatives and the stated social-ordering, positive-association, independence, non-imposition and non-dictatorship requirements.
Source-linked catalogue note. A detailed explanatory guide has not yet been prepared for this entry.
Scientific scope
The record follows the 1950 conditions rather than silently substituting a later axiom system. It is a conditional impossibility theorem about aggregation rules, not a claim that every voting method is useless or that collective decisions are impossible.
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People and systems
Kenneth J. Arrow
Listed source contributors; individual labor shares are not measured
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Documented countries / regions: United States
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English catalogue narrative
Arrow: the social-choice impossibility theorem
Showed an incompatibility between unrestricted preference orderings over at least three alternatives and the stated social-ordering, positive-association, independence, non-imposition and non-dictatorship requirements.
Scientific scope
The record follows the 1950 conditions rather than silently substituting a later axiom system. It is a conditional impossibility theorem about aggregation rules, not a claim that every voting method is useless or that collective decisions are impossible.
Reading status
This is a source-linked WRS catalogue note. A full explanatory guide and independent scientific reconstruction have not been completed for this entry. Read the identified original work for its complete narrative and arguments.
People and systems
Kenneth J. Arrow
Listed source contributors; individual labor shares are not measured