What is recorded here?
Decomposed overall strategic regret into information-set counterfactual regrets, enabling locally maintained regret-matching updates and approximate-equilibrium computation in large imperfect-information games.
Source-linked catalogue note. A detailed explanatory guide has not yet been prepared for this entry.
Scientific scope
Finite perfect-recall extensive games underpin the stated regret decomposition; average self-play strategies yield the equilibrium guarantee in the two-player zero-sum setting. It is not a universal Nash-convergence theorem for arbitrary multiplayer/general-sum learning or unrestricted imperfect-recall abstractions. Blackwell approachability/regret matching are inherited. Source theorem statements read, proofs not independently replayed.
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People and systems
Martin Zinkevich; Michael Johanson; Michael Bowling; Carmelo Piccione
Source-listed authors or explicitly credited technical contributors for the cited versions. Family entries retain source-specific attribution; a combined list is not one original-paper byline or equal individual work. Names alone do not establish resolved identities.
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English catalogue narrative
Counterfactual regret minimization in extensive-form games
Decomposed overall strategic regret into information-set counterfactual regrets, enabling locally maintained regret-matching updates and approximate-equilibrium computation in large imperfect-information games.
Scientific scope
Finite perfect-recall extensive games underpin the stated regret decomposition; average self-play strategies yield the equilibrium guarantee in the two-player zero-sum setting. It is not a universal Nash-convergence theorem for arbitrary multiplayer/general-sum learning or unrestricted imperfect-recall abstractions. Blackwell approachability/regret matching are inherited. Source theorem statements read, proofs not independently replayed.
Reading status
This is a source-linked WRS catalogue note. A full explanatory guide and independent scientific reconstruction have not been completed for this entry. Read the identified original work for its complete narrative and arguments.
People and systems
Martin Zinkevich; Michael Johanson; Michael Bowling; Carmelo Piccione
Source-listed authors or explicitly credited technical contributors for the cited versions. Family entries retain source-specific attribution; a combined list is not one original-paper byline or equal individual work. Names alone do not establish resolved identities.