What is recorded here?
Grew empirical meta-games of policies by learning approximate best responses to policy mixtures, then applied meta-strategy solvers; a decoupled hierarchy reduced the full payoff-tensor bottleneck.
Source-linked catalogue note. A detailed explanatory guide has not yet been prepared for this entry.
Scientific scope
Generalizes prior double-oracle, empirical game theory and fictitious-play ideas. Approximate response quality, finite policy populations and choice of meta-solver limit guarantees; a meta-game solution is not automatically a full-game Nash equilibrium. Full empirical payoff tensors have combinatorial cost, not free scaling.
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People and systems
Marc Lanctot; Vinicius Zambaldi; Audrūnas Gruslys; Angeliki Lazaridou; Karl Tuyls; Julien Pérolat; David Silver; Thore Graepel
Source-listed authors or explicitly credited technical contributors for the cited versions. Family entries retain source-specific attribution; a combined list is not one original-paper byline or equal individual work. Names alone do not establish resolved identities.
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English catalogue narrative
Policy-space response oracles and deep cognitive hierarchies
Grew empirical meta-games of policies by learning approximate best responses to policy mixtures, then applied meta-strategy solvers; a decoupled hierarchy reduced the full payoff-tensor bottleneck.
Scientific scope
Generalizes prior double-oracle, empirical game theory and fictitious-play ideas. Approximate response quality, finite policy populations and choice of meta-solver limit guarantees; a meta-game solution is not automatically a full-game Nash equilibrium. Full empirical payoff tensors have combinatorial cost, not free scaling.
Reading status
This is a source-linked WRS catalogue note. A full explanatory guide and independent scientific reconstruction have not been completed for this entry. Read the identified original work for its complete narrative and arguments.
People and systems
Marc Lanctot; Vinicius Zambaldi; Audrūnas Gruslys; Angeliki Lazaridou; Karl Tuyls; Julien Pérolat; David Silver; Thore Graepel
Source-listed authors or explicitly credited technical contributors for the cited versions. Family entries retain source-specific attribution; a combined list is not one original-paper byline or equal individual work. Names alone do not establish resolved identities.