What is recorded here?
SipHash combines a compact keyed ARX construction with fast short-input processing and an explicit PRF security goal for message authentication and secret-key hash-table defenses. A hash table can slow dramatically when many incoming names land in the same bucket. Choosing a public fast hash, or merely adding a weak secret salt, can leave that pattern predictable. Aumasson and Bernstein designed SipHash to make short-input hashing fast while treating the secret-key output as a cryptographic prediction problem. Their principal SipHash-2-4 proposal uses a 128-bit key, a 64-bit output and a four-word state, with two compression rounds per block and four finalization rounds. The original reports platform-specific speed measurements and preliminary cryptanalysis. Its security is an expectation supported by analysis, not a mathematical proof of the complete primitive. It is explicitly not collision-resistant, and secret hashing reduces rather than eliminates hash-flooding damage. This historical account does not independently certify cryptographic security or a deployed implementation.
Source-linked catalogue note. A detailed explanatory guide has not yet been prepared for this entry.
Scientific scope
SipHash is a keyed short-input pseudorandom-function/MAC design, not a collision-resistant unkeyed hash or password-hashing scheme. The default SipHash-2-4 and more conservative SipHash-4-8 have different round counts. Security is limited by the 128-bit key and 64-bit output, and assumes no key/state leakage or related-key access. The paper offers cryptanalytic evidence and stated expectations, not a proof that every variant is unbreakable. WRS has not independently replayed the attacks or benchmarks, and this historical entry is not current deployment guidance.
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People and systems
Jean-Philippe Aumasson; Daniel J. Bernstein
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English catalogue narrative
SipHash: fast secret-key hashing for short messages
SipHash combines a compact keyed ARX construction with fast short-input processing and an explicit PRF security goal for message authentication and secret-key hash-table defenses.
A hash table can slow dramatically when many incoming names land in the same bucket. Choosing a public fast hash, or merely adding a weak secret salt, can leave that pattern predictable. Aumasson and Bernstein designed SipHash to make short-input hashing fast while treating the secret-key output as a cryptographic prediction problem. Their principal SipHash-2-4 proposal uses a 128-bit key, a 64-bit output and a four-word state, with two compression rounds per block and four finalization rounds. The original reports platform-specific speed measurements and preliminary cryptanalysis. Its security is an expectation supported by analysis, not a mathematical proof of the complete primitive. It is explicitly not collision-resistant, and secret hashing reduces rather than eliminates hash-flooding damage. This historical account does not independently certify cryptographic security or a deployed implementation.
Scientific scope
SipHash is a keyed short-input pseudorandom-function/MAC design, not a collision-resistant unkeyed hash or password-hashing scheme. The default SipHash-2-4 and more conservative SipHash-4-8 have different round counts. Security is limited by the 128-bit key and 64-bit output, and assumes no key/state leakage or related-key access. The paper offers cryptanalytic evidence and stated expectations, not a proof that every variant is unbreakable. WRS has not independently replayed the attacks or benchmarks, and this historical entry is not current deployment guidance.
People and systems
Jean-Philippe Aumasson; Daniel J. Bernstein