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    "summary": "SipHash combines a compact keyed ARX construction with fast short-input processing and an explicit PRF security goal for message authentication and secret-key hash-table defenses.\n\nA hash table can slow dramatically when many incoming names land in the same bucket. Choosing a public fast hash, or merely adding a weak secret salt, can leave that pattern predictable. Aumasson and Bernstein designed SipHash to make short-input hashing fast while treating the secret-key output as a cryptographic prediction problem. Their principal SipHash-2-4 proposal uses a 128-bit key, a 64-bit output and a four-word state, with two compression rounds per block and four finalization rounds. The original reports platform-specific speed measurements and preliminary cryptanalysis. Its security is an expectation supported by analysis, not a mathematical proof of the complete primitive. It is explicitly not collision-resistant, and secret hashing reduces rather than eliminates hash-flooding damage. This historical account does not independently certify cryptographic security or a deployed implementation.",
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        "description": "SipHash is a keyed short-input pseudorandom-function/MAC design, not a collision-resistant unkeyed hash or password-hashing scheme. The default SipHash-2-4 and more conservative SipHash-4-8 have different round counts. Security is limited by the 128-bit key and 64-bit output, and assumes no key/state leakage or related-key access. The paper offers cryptanalytic evidence and stated expectations, not a proof that every variant is unbreakable. WRS has not independently replayed the attacks or benchmarks, and this historical entry is not current deployment guidance.",
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      "statement": "# SipHash: fast secret-key hashing for short messages\n\nSipHash combines a compact keyed ARX construction with fast short-input processing and an explicit PRF security goal for message authentication and secret-key hash-table defenses.\n\nA hash table can slow dramatically when many incoming names land in the same bucket. Choosing a public fast hash, or merely adding a weak secret salt, can leave that pattern predictable. Aumasson and Bernstein designed SipHash to make short-input hashing fast while treating the secret-key output as a cryptographic prediction problem. Their principal SipHash-2-4 proposal uses a 128-bit key, a 64-bit output and a four-word state, with two compression rounds per block and four finalization rounds. The original reports platform-specific speed measurements and preliminary cryptanalysis. Its security is an expectation supported by analysis, not a mathematical proof of the complete primitive. It is explicitly not collision-resistant, and secret hashing reduces rather than eliminates hash-flooding damage. This historical account does not independently certify cryptographic security or a deployed implementation.\n\n## Scientific scope\n\nSipHash is a keyed short-input pseudorandom-function/MAC design, not a collision-resistant unkeyed hash or password-hashing scheme. The default SipHash-2-4 and more conservative SipHash-4-8 have different round counts. Security is limited by the 128-bit key and 64-bit output, and assumes no key/state leakage or related-key access. The paper offers cryptanalytic evidence and stated expectations, not a proof that every variant is unbreakable. WRS has not independently replayed the attacks or benchmarks, and this historical entry is not current deployment guidance.\n\n## People and systems\n\nJean-Philippe Aumasson; Daniel J. Bernstein\n\n\n\n## Original sources\n\n- [Aumasson and Bernstein: SipHash, a fast short-input PRF (author version2012.09.18)](https://cr.yp.to/siphash/siphash-20120918.pdf)\n",
      "summary": "SipHash combines a compact keyed ARX construction with fast short-input processing and an explicit PRF security goal for message authentication and secret-key hash-table defenses.\n\nA hash table can slow dramatically when many incoming names land in the same bucket. Choosing a public fast hash, or merely adding a weak secret salt, can leave that pattern predictable. Aumasson and Bernstein designed SipHash to make short-input hashing fast while treating the secret-key output as a cryptographic prediction problem. Their principal SipHash-2-4 proposal uses a 128-bit key, a 64-bit output and a four-word state, with two compression rounds per block and four finalization rounds. The original reports platform-specific speed measurements and preliminary cryptanalysis. Its security is an expectation supported by analysis, not a mathematical proof of the complete primitive. It is explicitly not collision-resistant, and secret hashing reduces rather than eliminates hash-flooding damage. This historical account does not independently certify cryptographic security or a deployed implementation.",
      "title": "SipHash: fast secret-key hashing for short messages"
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