What is recorded here?
Demonstrated how a compiler can be modified to insert a Trojan horse into target programs and reproduce the attack when compiling a clean compiler source, exposing a source-level verification limit.
Source-linked catalogue note. A detailed explanatory guide has not yet been prepared for this entry.
Scientific scope
The record is the exact 1984 Turing Award lecture article. Unix authorship, generic malware, later diverse double-compiling defenses and supply-chain incidents remain separate.
Read the original work
- University of Cambridge copy of Reflections on Trusting Trust
- Crossref record for Reflections on Trusting Trust
This English explanation is an editorial reading view. It does not replace the complete original work or certify its science.
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People and systems
Ken Thompson
The named authors contributed to this scoped work; individual effort shares and later applications are not assigned by the byline.
Research locations and affiliations
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Documented countries / regions: United States
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English catalogue narrative
Thompson: reflections on trusting trust
Demonstrated how a compiler can be modified to insert a Trojan horse into target programs and reproduce the attack when compiling a clean compiler source, exposing a source-level verification limit.
Scientific scope
The record is the exact 1984 Turing Award lecture article. Unix authorship, generic malware, later diverse double-compiling defenses and supply-chain incidents remain separate.
Reading status
This is a source-linked WRS catalogue note. A full explanatory guide and independent scientific reconstruction have not been completed for this entry. Read the identified original work for its complete narrative and arguments.
People and systems
Ken Thompson
The named authors contributed to this scoped work; individual effort shares and later applications are not assigned by the byline.