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Kocher and colleagues: Spectre speculative-execution attacks

Demonstrated practical attacks that induce speculative execution to perform otherwise unreachable operations and leak victim information through measurable microarchitectural side effects.

What is recorded here?

Demonstrated practical attacks that induce speculative execution to perform otherwise unreachable operations and leak victim information through measurable microarchitectural side effects.

Source-linked catalogue note. A detailed explanatory guide has not yet been prepared for this entry.

Scientific scope

The record is the exact 2019 IEEE paper and its twelve-author final byline. Meltdown, later Spectre variants, vendor mitigations, disclosure coordination and every affected processor remain separate.

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People and systems

Paul Kocher; Jann Horn; Anders Fogh; Daniel Genkin; Daniel Gruss; Werner Haas; Mike Hamburg; Moritz Lipp; Stefan Mangard; Thomas Prescher; Michael Schwarz; Yuval Yarom

The named authors contributed to this scoped work; individual effort shares and later applications are not assigned by the byline.

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English catalogue narrative

Kocher and colleagues: Spectre speculative-execution attacks

Demonstrated practical attacks that induce speculative execution to perform otherwise unreachable operations and leak victim information through measurable microarchitectural side effects.

Scientific scope

The record is the exact 2019 IEEE paper and its twelve-author final byline. Meltdown, later Spectre variants, vendor mitigations, disclosure coordination and every affected processor remain separate.

Reading status

This is a source-linked WRS catalogue note. A full explanatory guide and independent scientific reconstruction have not been completed for this entry. Read the identified original work for its complete narrative and arguments.

People and systems

Paul Kocher; Jann Horn; Anders Fogh; Daniel Genkin; Daniel Gruss; Werner Haas; Mike Hamburg; Moritz Lipp; Stefan Mangard; Thomas Prescher; Michael Schwarz; Yuval Yarom

The named authors contributed to this scoped work; individual effort shares and later applications are not assigned by the byline.

Original sources