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Shapley: stochastic games

Defined a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic games with state transitions and proved the existence and characterization of values for the discounted finite-state setting treated in the paper.

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Defined a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic games with state transitions and proved the existence and characterization of values for the discounted finite-state setting treated in the paper.

Source-linked catalogue note. A detailed explanatory guide has not yet been prepared for this entry.

Scientific scope

The record is the exact 1953 PNAS paper. Repeated games, general-sum stochastic games, Markov decision processes, reinforcement-learning algorithms and later equilibrium refinements remain separate.

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People and systems

Lloyd S. Shapley

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Documented countries / regions: United States

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English catalogue narrative

Shapley: stochastic games

Defined a class of two-player zero-sum stochastic games with state transitions and proved the existence and characterization of values for the discounted finite-state setting treated in the paper.

Scientific scope

The record is the exact 1953 PNAS paper. Repeated games, general-sum stochastic games, Markov decision processes, reinforcement-learning algorithms and later equilibrium refinements remain separate.

Reading status

This is a source-linked WRS catalogue note. A full explanatory guide and independent scientific reconstruction have not been completed for this entry. Read the identified original work for its complete narrative and arguments.

People and systems

Lloyd S. Shapley

The named authors contributed to this scoped work; individual effort shares and later applications are not assigned by the byline.

Original sources