What is recorded here?
Organized computer information protection around architectural mechanisms and eight design principles, including fail-safe defaults, complete mediation, open design, separation of privilege and least privilege.
Source-linked catalogue note. A detailed explanatory guide has not yet been prepared for this entry.
Scientific scope
The record is the exact two-author 1975 invited tutorial paper and the principles it states. Earlier individual suggestions acknowledged in the paper, Multics implementations, later security taxonomies and modern secure-development practice remain separate.
Read the original work
- Saltzer and Schroeder, The Protection of Information in Computer Systems
- Crossref record for Saltzer and Schroeder 1975
This English explanation is an editorial reading view. It does not replace the complete original work or certify its science.
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People and systems
Jerome H. Saltzer; Michael D. Schroeder
The named authors contributed to this scoped work; individual effort shares and later applications are not assigned by the byline.
Research locations and affiliations
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Documented countries / regions: United States
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English catalogue narrative
Saltzer and Schroeder: principles for protecting information
Organized computer information protection around architectural mechanisms and eight design principles, including fail-safe defaults, complete mediation, open design, separation of privilege and least privilege.
Scientific scope
The record is the exact two-author 1975 invited tutorial paper and the principles it states. Earlier individual suggestions acknowledged in the paper, Multics implementations, later security taxonomies and modern secure-development practice remain separate.
Reading status
This is a source-linked WRS catalogue note. A full explanatory guide and independent scientific reconstruction have not been completed for this entry. Read the identified original work for its complete narrative and arguments.
People and systems
Jerome H. Saltzer; Michael D. Schroeder
The named authors contributed to this scoped work; individual effort shares and later applications are not assigned by the byline.