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    "summary": "Merkle describes selecting a shared key over a publicly readable but integrity-protected channel using many deliberately solvable encrypted puzzles, producing a quadratic passive-search work gap in the stated classical model.\n\nTwo people usually need an already secret key to begin encrypted communication. Ralph C. Merkle explores another possibility: one person publishes many puzzles, each containing a hidden identifier and a future communication key. The other person chooses and solves one puzzle, then returns its identifier. The creator can recover the matching key cheaply; a passive observer does not know which published puzzle has that identifier and must search many of them. In the paper’s model, the communicating parties do work proportional to the number of puzzles while the observer’s average search cost grows quadratically. This is a conceptual separation rather than a practical modern security guarantee. It depends on strong underlying encryption, randomness and an integrity-protected key channel. The paper acknowledges that its quadratic gap is expensive and adds later public-key developments to its original proposal. This contribution differs from Merkle’s hash-tree work and is represented by the published 1978 paper, which records submission in August 1975.",
    "boundary": "The puzzle protocol uses the stated computational work and random-choice model. Its honest/adversarial work gap is not an unconditional secrecy theorem or modern practical public-key deployment recommendation. Eavesdropping, active interference and cryptographic assumptions require separate analysis. Earlier conception, publication and later schemes should not be counted as separate discoveries.",
    "area": "Computer science",
    "topic": "Cryptographic foundations",
    "year": 1978,
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        "title": "Merkle1978: Secure communications over insecure channels",
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        "title": "Brassard/Hoyer/Kalach/Kaplan/Laplante/Salvail: Key establishment a la Merkle in a quantum world",
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        "description": "The puzzle protocol uses the stated computational work and random-choice model. Its honest/adversarial work gap is not an unconditional secrecy theorem or modern practical public-key deployment recommendation. Eavesdropping, active interference and cryptographic assumptions require separate analysis. Earlier conception, publication and later schemes should not be counted as separate discoveries.",
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        {
          "citation": "Merkle1978: Secure communications over insecure channels",
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      "statement": "# Merkle’s puzzles: agreeing on a key in public\n\nMerkle describes selecting a shared key over a publicly readable but integrity-protected channel using many deliberately solvable encrypted puzzles, producing a quadratic passive-search work gap in the stated classical model.\n\nTwo people usually need an already secret key to begin encrypted communication. Ralph C. Merkle explores another possibility: one person publishes many puzzles, each containing a hidden identifier and a future communication key. The other person chooses and solves one puzzle, then returns its identifier. The creator can recover the matching key cheaply; a passive observer does not know which published puzzle has that identifier and must search many of them. In the paper’s model, the communicating parties do work proportional to the number of puzzles while the observer’s average search cost grows quadratically. This is a conceptual separation rather than a practical modern security guarantee. It depends on strong underlying encryption, randomness and an integrity-protected key channel. The paper acknowledges that its quadratic gap is expensive and adds later public-key developments to its original proposal. This contribution differs from Merkle’s hash-tree work and is represented by the published 1978 paper, which records submission in August 1975.\n\n## Scientific scope\n\nThe puzzle protocol uses the stated computational work and random-choice model. Its honest/adversarial work gap is not an unconditional secrecy theorem or modern practical public-key deployment recommendation. Eavesdropping, active interference and cryptographic assumptions require separate analysis. Earlier conception, publication and later schemes should not be counted as separate discoveries.\n\n## People and systems\n\nRalph C. Merkle\n\n\n\n## Original sources\n\n- [Merkle1978: Secure communications over insecure channels](https://parthad.com/Teaching/539-CommonFiles/Merkle-Paper.PDF)\n- [Brassard/Hoyer/Kalach/Kaplan/Laplante/Salvail: Key establishment a la Merkle in a quantum world](https://arxiv.org/abs/1108.2316v2)\n",
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    "what_changed": "Merkle describes selecting a shared key over a publicly readable but integrity-protected channel using many deliberately solvable encrypted puzzles, producing a quadratic passive-search work gap in the stated classical model.",
    "scope": "Merkle describes selecting a shared key over a publicly readable but integrity-protected channel using many deliberately solvable encrypted puzzles, producing a quadratic passive-search work gap in the stated classical model. The puzzle protocol uses the stated computational work and random-choice model. Its honest/adversarial work gap is not an unconditional secrecy theorem or modern practical public-key deployment recommendation. Eavesdropping, active interference and cryptographic assumptions require separate analysis. Earlier conception, publication and later schemes should not be counted as separate discoveries.",
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